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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the differences in hourly
labour productivity growth rates and levels
between the Nordic EU countries (Denmark,
Finland and Sweden) and four larger euro area
countries (Germany, France, Italy and Spain).
Additional information for the euro area as a
whole, the UK and the US is also provided.
Given that the economic and social models
developed in the Nordic EU countries are in
many ways closer to those of the larger euro
area countries than that of the US, the
experience of these countries is particularly
interesting. Since the mid-1990s, the Nordic
EU countries, particularly Sweden and
Finland, have experienced stronger labour
productivity growth than the larger euro
countries. Like in the US, innovation and
technological changes have played a major role
in explaining the higher labour productivity
growth in the Nordic EU countries compared
with the larger euro area economies.
Information and Communication Technology
(ICT) diffusion is a key element to explain
these differences. A number of institutional
indicators, relating to market regulation,
human capital, R&D investments and venture
capital, show that the Nordic EU economies are
better positioned than some of the larger euro
area countries to exploit the opportunities
provided by ICT in terms of productivity
growth. However, remaining labour market
rigidities may not allow the Nordic EU
countries to fully enjoy the benefits of ICT
diffusion in terms of increased employment.5
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The aim of this Occasional Paper is to
determine the extent to which hourly labour
productivity growth rates and levels have been
higher in the Nordic EU countries (Denmark,
Sweden and Finland) compared with the larger
euro area countries (Germany, France, Italy
and Spain), and to examine the driving forces
behind the different patterns.
Since the mid-1990s, the Nordic EU countries,
particularly Sweden and Finland, have
experienced stronger hourly labour
productivity growth than the larger euro area
countries. Combined with a high level of labour
utilisation, this has resulted in a “structural”
labour productivity level that is relatively high
compared with some of those larger euro area
countries. As has also been the case in the
United States, innovation and technological
changes have played a major role in raising
labour productivity growth in the Nordic EU
countries.
In Denmark ICT and non-ICT capital
deepening have been the main contributors to
hourly labour productivity growth. While TFP
growth has played a smaller role than in the two
other Nordic EU countries, the contributions of
both ICT and non-ICT capital deepening to
labour productivity growth have been much
higher than in the larger euro area countries.
Denmark has also tended to outperform the
largest euro area countries in the ICT-using
service sectors, but it lags significantly behind
Germany and France with regard to the ICT-
producing manufacturing sectors.
In Sweden hourly labour productivity growth
has been mainly driven by the contribution
of TFP and, to a lesser extent, ICT capital
deepening. The stronger labour productivity
growth patterns compared with the larger euro
area countries have mainly been driven by the
relatively high TFP and ICT capital deepening
contributions to aggregate labour productivity
growth, with a high contribution of the
ICT-using service sectors. The ICT-producing
manufacturing sector has also contributed to
widening the labour productivity gap with the
larger euro area countries.
In Finland the relatively high hourly labour
productivity growth compared with the larger
euro area countries is mainly a result of the
high contribution of TFP growth and, at the
sectoral level, the high contribution of the
ICT-producing manufacturing sectors. The
hourly labour productivity growth observed in
the ICT-using service sectors has also
contributed to raising labour productivity
growth relative to the larger euro area countries.
Only a few countries may have the necessary
comparative advantages to succeed in the ICT-
producing sectors that are characterised by
very rapid technological progress, strong
competition, price declines and high labour
productivity growth. Much of the interest in the
potential impact of ICT on growth is, therefore,
not linked to the ICT-producing sector, but to
the potential benefits arising from its use in the
production process elsewhere in the economy.
From a policy point of view, given the higher
potential for employment creation in the
services sectors combined with the evidence
that there is no apparent trade-off in the
medium term between labour productivity and
employment growth thanks to increased ICT
use, ICT diffusion appears to be particularly
relevant in the services sectors. As a result, the
key issue for the larger euro area countries is
how to increase their future capacity to
promote the diffusion of innovation and, in
particular, technological changes in the service
sectors, a field in which the Nordic EU
countries have performed particularly well.
The high degree of product and financial
market competition, a highly skilled
workforce, high investments in R&D and
the availability of venture capital, all areas
in which the Nordic countries are among
the best performers, seem to be the main
explanatory factors behind the relatively strong
performance of the Nordic EU countries. These
“comparative advantages” probably facilitated6
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the expansion of ICT-production and diffusion
and may explain why the structural
characteristics of these economies were more
conducive to exploiting the opportunities
provided by new technologies than the larger
euro area countries. At the same time,
remaining labour market rigidities in these
countries may inhibit the full realisation of
employment gains from greater competition
and innovation, as product and labour market
features can have important complementary
effects.
Looking ahead, and given the need to further
increase the level of labour resource utilisation
in the larger euro area countries, the gap in
labour productivity growth between the larger
euro area countries and the Nordic EU
countries may widen further, unless
appropriate structural reforms take place in the
euro area. In this respect, the experience of the
Nordic EU countries provides some useful
insights and lessons.
1 INTRODUCTION
Since the second half of the 1990s the widening
gap observed between Europe and the United
States in terms of hourly labour productivity
growth has become a major source of concern
for European policy-makers. This widening
mainly reflects acceleration in the United
States and a simultaneous slowdown in Europe.
Several studies have shed light on the driving
forces behind the relatively poor performance
of Europe. Overall, there appear to be two main
reasons for the divergence in labour
productivity growth between Europe and the
United States: on the one hand, in the United
States the production and diffusion of
information and communication technology
(ICT)1 seems to have played a larger positive
role.2 On the other hand, wage moderation and
labour market reforms in Europe, aimed at
increasing the employment intensity of growth,
might have temporarily resulted in weaker
labour productivity growth.3 However, the
European aggregate data hide important
disparities across countries. The Nordic EU
countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden)
have also achieved higher labour productivity
growth than most of the larger euro area
countries since the mid-1990s. Given that the
economic and social models developed in these
countries are in many ways closer to those of
the larger euro area countries than that of the
United States, the experience of these countries
is particularly interesting.
The aim of this Occasional Paper is to
determine the extent to which hourly labour
productivity changes and levels have been
higher in the Nordic EU countries compared
with the four larger euro area countries
(Germany, France, Italy and Spain), and to
examine the driving forces behind the different
patterns. Additional information for the euro
area as a whole, 4 the United Kingdom and the
United States is also presented. Chapter 2 deals
with labour productivity growth and levels per
hour worked over the period 1980-2004.
Chapter 3 provides a decomposition of labour
productivity growth over the period 1991-2004
into its underlying components: capital
deepening (separating between ICT and
non-ICT) and total factor productivity
growth (TFP). Chapter 4 presents a sectoral
decomposition of the labour productivity
growth performance, focusing more
particularly on the ICT-producing and using
sectors in manufacturing and services. Finally,
Chapter 5 highlights some key figures from
structural indicators that may explain these
patterns.
It is important to mention a number of
caveats related to the measurement of
labour productivity. Indeed, data on labour
productivity and ICT are surrounded by
considerable uncertainty and caution is
therefore required when interpreting the
1 For simplicity, the term ICT will be used as a general term
although some studies often refer more specifically to only
IT.
2 See Oliner and Sichel (2002), Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh
(2002), and Jorgenson (2003).
3 See IMF (2004).
4 See also ECB (2004) and ECB (2005).7
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results. In order to be consistent across
countries, this paper uses a database developed
by the Groningen Growth and Development
Centre (GGDC),5 which also allows for a
sectoral breakdown. Aggregate data are
available up until 2004, while data for the
sectoral breakdown are only available until
2002, which means that sectoral developments
in the most recent years are not covered.
It is also important to mention that other
databases, such as the OECD STAN database,
or national sources sometimes show significant
discrepancies for some countries compared
with the GGDC database.
2 LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY: A COMPARATIVE
OVERVIEW 1980-2004
2.1 AGGREGATE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY
GROWTH
Given the significant decline in working time
over the last decades in almost all EU15
countries,6 it is useful to measure labour
productivity in terms of hours worked.
However, statistics for hours worked are
generally considered to be of poorer quality
than total employment statistics. Differences
in labour productivity per hour worked across
countries may consequently reflect the still
imperfect harmonisation of annual working
hour estimates.
5 This database was developed for a study on EU Productivity
and Competitiveness entitled “An Industry Perspective; Can
Europe Resume the Catching-up Process?” by O’Mahony and
van Ark (2003).
6 See, for instance, Leiner-Killinger, Madaschi and Ward-
Warmedinger (2005).
Bearing this in mind, Table 1 shows the
aggregate changes of labour productivity per
hour worked in the selected EU countries, the
euro area as a whole and the United States over
the period 1980-2004.
The data in Table 1 reveal that Finland has been
among the countries with the highest hourly
labour productivity growth throughout the
period. Labour productivity growth in Finland
has even been higher than in the United States,
with the exception of the last period. In
addition, the gap in labour productivity growth
between Finland and the larger euro area
countries and the euro area as a whole widened
in the second half of the 1990s, reflecting both
the increase in Finland and the weakening
labour productivity growth performance
observed in Germany, Spain and Italy.
Over the same period, hourly labour
productivity growth in Sweden accelerated
significantly and became higher than the
hourly labour productivity growth observed in
the second half of the 1990s in the larger euro
area countries and the euro area as a whole.
Hourly labour productivity growth in Sweden
was also higher than in the United Kingdom as
Table 1 Labour productivity growth per hour worked
(average annual % change)
Source: GGDC.
Note: Prior to 1990, data for Germany (and the euro area) refer to West Germany.
1980-1989 1990-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004
Germany 2.4 2.9 2.3 1.3
Spain 3.7 2.2 -0.3 0.3
France 2.9 1.5 1.7 1.9
Italy 2.0 2.0 0.9 -0.2
Finland 2.9 2.5 2.8 2.2
Euro area 2.4 2.1 1.5 0.9
Denmark 2.2 2.2 1.6 1.9
Sweden 1.1 1.9 2.4 2.4
United Kingdom 2.2 2.5 2.1 2.0
United States 1.3 1.2 2.1 2.98
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of the mid-1990s but, like in Finland, it fell
behind the US performance over the period
2001-2004.
In Denmark hourly labour productivity growth
tended to follow the euro area performance
until around 2000. In a similar manner to most
of the larger euro area countries, labour
productivity growth weakened markedly in the
second half of the 1990s. However, over the
period 2001-2004 hourly labour productivity
growth in Denmark strengthened again.
2.2 AGGREGATE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY
LEVEL
Turning to the situation in terms of levels,
comparisons of hourly labour productivity can
provide useful information on the relative
standing of a country and can also yield
useful insights into the potential for further
productivity growth and catch-up.7 However,
uncertainty related to the measurement of
labour productivity levels is even higher than
that for growth rates. It is, therefore, important
to remember that caution is required when
comparing the results across countries and,
in particular, that small differences across
countries are not significant.
Table 2 shows the hourly labour productivity
levels in 2003 relative to the euro area average.
The hourly productivity level is defined as GDP
at constant prices expressed in PPP relative to
total hours worked. Overall, the data on
observed labour productivity levels provide a
more mixed picture compared with growth rates.
First, among the Nordic EU countries, while
Denmark was at a similar level to the euro area
average, Sweden and Finland lagged slightly
behind. Second, the Nordic EU countries were
more or less in line with Italy although, more
significantly, they lagged behind Germany and,
in particular, France, while they recorded
significantly higher levels than Spain.
However, the average annual hours worked per
worker and/or the employment rate is usually
higher in the Nordic EU countries than in the
euro area. Adjusting for the diminishing
returns of these two components of labour
utilisation, Table 2 also reports a “structural”
7 See Pilat (1996a).
Table 2 Observed and structural hourly labour productivity levels: 2003
Sources: GGDC and European Commission.
Note: The hourly labour productivity levels are calculated by using PPPs from 2002. The observed labour productivity level for
France is unusually high when compared with other databases. The main reasons for that are the lower level of hours worked per
worker and, to a lesser extent, the lower employment level.
Adjustment Adjustment
Observed effect (in %) effect (in %)
hourly Average of the gap with of the gap with Structural
labour annual the euro area the euro area hourly labour
productivity Employment hours worked in employment in working productivity
level (index) rate (in %) per worker rate time (index)
(a) (b) (c) (a + b + c)
Germany 106 65.0 1,441 1.9 -2.4 105
Spain 80 59.8 1,799 -2.2 5.6 83
France 122 63.2 1,429 0.5 -2.7 120
Italy 97 56.1 1,609 -5.2 1.4 93
Finland 96 67.7 1,635 4.1 1.9 102
Euro area 100 62.6 1,549 0.0 0.0 100
Denmark 99 75.1 1,519 10.0 -0.7 108
Sweden 95 72.9 1,553 8.2 0.1 103
United Kingdom 95 71.5 1,624 7.1 1.7 104
United States 107 71.2 1,817 6.9 6.1 1209
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hourly labour productivity level, which
compares productivity levels under the
assumption of equivalent levels of average
working hours and employment rates in all
countries and in the euro area.8 This measure
provides a more positive picture for the Nordic
EU countries. Indeed, Finland, Sweden and,
more specifically, Denmark are now at the
higher end of the spectrum compared with the
larger euro area countries and the euro area as a
whole, with the significant exception of
France.9
2.3 SUMMARY
Since the second half of the 1990s the Nordic
EU countries, and Sweden and Finland in
particular, have, like the United States,
experienced stronger hourly labour
productivity growth than the larger euro area
countries. In addition, these countries have
relatively higher levels of labour utilisation
than the larger euro area countries. When
adjusting for the differences in labour
utilisation across countries, the labour
productivity levels of Denmark, Finland and
Sweden (and the United Kingdom and the
United States) improve significantly, while the
levels in the larger euro area countries decrease
somewhat, with the exception of Spain.
Accordingly, in terms of potential for further
productivity growth, there is still plenty of
scope for increasing labour productivity to the
levels prevailing in the United States, in
particular in some of the larger euro area
countries. Given the sizeable differences
across countries in labour productivity, both in
terms of changes and levels, and the apparent
pattern of higher labour productivity growth in
the Nordic EU countries compared with the
larger euro area countries, a pattern which may
see further convergence towards the high levels
prevailing in the United States, one important
question arises: what are the driving forces
behind these developments?
3 DECOMPOSITION OF LABOUR
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
3.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In the context of standard growth accounting
frameworks, labour productivity growth can be
decomposed in terms of the contributions from
capital deepening and total factor productivity
(TFP) growth.10 Capital deepening denotes the
changes in the use of physical capital per
worker in the production process and can be
seen as a measure of capital productivity. It can
also be linked to labour market and labour cost
developments. In the following analysis, we
will draw a distinction between ICT and non-
ICT capital deepening. TFP growth or the so-
called “Solow residual” is usually attributed
to innovation and to technological and
organisational improvements. From the
viewpoint of analysis and policy relevance, it is
important to make the distinction between
embodied technological change, which arises
from changes in the composition of production
inputs (capital and labour), and disembodied
technological change (TFP growth), which
reflects shifts in the production function.
Embodied technological change represents
advances in the design and quality of new
vintages of capital and intermediate inputs and
its effects are attributed to the respective
production factor as long as the factor is
remunerated accordingly. Disembodied
technological change comes in the form of
applying general knowledge, blueprints,
network effects or spillover from other factors
8 For more details on the concept and methodology of
“structural” hourly productivity levels, see Cette (2004).
9 The same computation with the OECD data provides
different results, in particular for France, where the
“structural” hourly productivity level is significantly below
that observed in the United States but still the highest among
the above EU countries.
10 The computation of TFP is based on a Cobb-Douglas
production function, Y=Lα K () α − 1 TFP, where Y is real
GDP, K is total capital input (net capital stock or capital
service), L is total labour input (either total employment
or total hours worked), TFP is Total Factor Productivity and
α is the labour share. As a result, labour productivity
growth can be decomposed as follows:  (Y/L) = (1- )D(K/L)
+ DTFP. For further explanations of the growth accounting
framework, see Musso and Westermann (2005).10
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of production, including better management
and organisational change.
This type of presentation facilitates the
interpretation of labour productivity
developments and can provide a first indication
of the driving factors behind the diverging
labour productivity growth patterns in the
Nordic EU countries and the larger euro area
economies. However, the measurement of
production inputs and TFP growth is
surrounded by considerable uncertainty. For
instance, given the problem of properly
measuring and capturing improvements in
capital and labour input, measured TFP growth,
which is calculated as a residual, does not only
include disembodied technological change but
also part of the embodied technological change
and improvements in the skill composition of
the workforce (for more details, see Box 1).
Furthermore, TFP growth is not necessarily
caused by technological change. Indeed, other
non-technology factors will also be picked up
by the residual. Such factors may include
adjustment costs and scale and cyclical effects,
as well as pure changes in efficiency and
measurement errors.
Box 1
CAPITAL SERVICES AND LABOUR QUALITY
Using the concept of capital services (as in the GGDC database) instead of net capital stocks
for the calculation of TFP may solve some of the measurement issues mentioned above. While
the net capital stock, which is a measure of wealth, is often used for data availability reasons,
economic theory suggests that the wealth concept of capital is not appropriate for a production
function and, hence, for TFP calculations. For this purpose, a measure of aggregate services
yielded by the capital stock is needed. Based on the economic theory of production, the concept
of capital services relates back to the work of Jorgenson and Griliches (1967).1 One important
insight is that the vast heterogeneity of capital inputs must be accounted for. For any given type
of asset, there is a flow of productive services from the cumulative stock of past investments.
This flow of productive services is called capital services of an asset type. For instance,
investment in new computer equipment provides different productive services per period than
investment in a new building. The main difference between the capital service and the wealth
measures is the way in which different types and ages of asset are aggregated together. In
capital services, each item of capital (an asset of a particular vintage) is weighted by its rental
price (or user cost)2. The rental price is the price that the user would have to pay to hire the asset
for a period. By contrast, in wealth measures of capital stock each item is weighted by the asset
price (i.e. the price at which it could be sold to another user). Some authors use “capital
quality” to denote the difference between capital service flows and capital stock, as it reflects
the changing composition of investment towards assets with higher marginal products. As a
result, a shift in investment towards high-tech equipment with a higher marginal product leads
capital services to grow more quickly than the capital stock. As an illustration, the chart below
plots the capital service and net capital stock indices for Denmark, Sweden and Finland. As can
be seen, net capital stocks tend to underestimate capital accumulation, especially in times of
rapid technological change and falling prices, and, as a consequence, overestimate TFP
growth.
1 With further developments by Jorgenson (1995), Hulten (1990), Triplett (1996,1998), Hill (2000) and Diewert (2001).
2 UC = P * ( r + D  – DP), where UC represents the user cost or the rental price of a type of asset, P is price, r is the rate of return,
D is the depreciation rate and DP is the growth of P.11
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However, even if the concept of capital
services provides a significant improvement
for productivity analysis, the computation of
capital services raises a number of challenges,
and important measurement problems remain.
Indeed, given that producers usually own
their capital goods, no market transaction is
recorded when the capital good “delivers”
services to its owner. The measurement of
these implicit transactions – whose quantities
are the services drawn from the capital stock
during a period and whose prices are the user
costs or rental prices of capital – is one of the
challenges of capital measurement for
productivity analysis.
Another important extension (not taken into
account in the GGDC data) is the explicit
inclusion of the contribution of changes in
labour quality. Economists have long
recognised the importance of investment in
human capital, and expenditure on education,
job training and health care all increase the
quality of human labour and, hence, enhance
productivity. Griliches (1960), Denison
(1962) and Jorgenson and Griliches (1967)
pioneered the use of wage data to weight
heterogeneous workers and construct
constant quality indexes of labour. Similar to
the treatment of capital, this approach
captures substitution between different types
of labour and results in a flow of labour inputs
appropriate for the production function
analysis. While there are few studies
calculating the effects of labour quality on
productivity on a comparable basis, a study
for the Nordic Council (2005) showed that
improvements in labour quality could explain
around 0.2 percentage point of total labour productivity growth in Denmark, Sweden and
Finland in the second half of the 1990s.
Capital service and net capital stock indices
for Denmark, Sweden and Finland,
1979-2004
(index 1979 = 100)
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3.2 DECOMPOSITION RESULTS
As shown in Figure 1,11 the TFP contribution to
labour productivity growth (disembodied
technological change such as product
innovations) has, since 1996, been
considerably stronger  in Finland than in the
larger euro area countries, the United Kingdom
and the United States, explaining in turn the
diverging patterns of labour productivity
growth between Finland and the larger euro
11 Based on GGDC data, which use the concept of capital
services but are not corrected for labour quality changes.12
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area countries. In Sweden the TFP and ICT-
capital deepening contributions (embodied
technological change) over the same period
have been significantly stronger than in the
larger euro area economies. Finally, in
Denmark ICT and non-ICT capital deepening
have been the main contributors to total labour
productivity growth and both have been
significantly higher than in the larger euro area
countries. By contrast, the contribution of TFP
to labour productivity growth has been
significantly lower than in most larger euro
area economies and also lower than in the other
Nordic EU countries, the United Kingdom and
the United States.
Studying the way in which these components
have evolved over time across countries also
reveals some interesting results. Figure 2
shows the different contributions to labour
productivity growth over the periods 1991-
Figure 1 Contributions to hourly labour
productivity growth: 1996-2004
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Source: GGDC.
Figure 2 Changes in contributions to hourly
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1995, 1996-2000 and 2001-2004. While it is
clear that the contribution of TFP and ICT
capital deepening moderated in most countries
in the period 2001-2004, partly resulting from
cyclical effects and, in particular, the collapse
of the ICT sector, the only countries to
experience acceleration in TFP growth in the
same period were Sweden, the United Kingdom
and the United States. This could be partly
related to relatively high level of ICT
investments in the preceding period (1996-
2000). Indeed, a number of papers have
highlighted the fact that increased use of ICT
generates spillover effects with some delay,
raising TFP growth (Bartelsman and
Hinloopen, 2002). This also seems to have
occurred previously in Finland, during the
periods 1991-1995 and 1996-2000. However,
developments in Denmark run counter to this
idea. Indeed, while the ICT capital deepening
contribution to labour productivity growth
was, on average, similar to the levels observed
in Sweden, the United States and the United
Kingdom during the period 1991-2004, TFP
growth has decelerated significantly over time.
The figures in Table 3 on the share of ICT
capital services in total capital services tend to
confirm the stronger effort in ICT investment
and in diffusing ICT products in the economy in
the Nordic EU countries, as well as in the
United Kingdom and the United States. This is
particularly the case in Sweden, where the
share of ICT capital services in total capital
services increased significantly between 1990
and 2004 to reach a level close to that seen in
the United States, while it represented barely
half of this level in the larger euro area
countries and in the euro area as a whole and
has even declined in some larger euro area
countries (Germany, Spain and Italy) compared
with 1990.
4 SECTORAL LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY
GROWTH 1996-2002
4.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF SECTORAL
DEVELOPMENTS
Aggregate and decomposed estimates of labour
productivity do not provide insights into the
sectoral composition of productivity. It is
possible for countries to be highly productive
and to enjoy strong labour productivity growth
in one sector while remaining among the less
well-performing countries in another sector.
Such differences are important in helping to
determine the sectors in which there may be
scope for additional productivity growth to
catch up with other countries. In addition, the
opportunities offered by adopting new
technologies may be completely different
across sectors and may have very different
impacts on output, employment and
productivity performance. For instance, in




1990 1995 2000 2004
Germany 12.41) 11.4 10.3 9.2
Spain 10.1 8.8 8.4 8.1
France 6.8 6.2 6.4 7.6
Italy 10.7 9.8 9.2 9.8
Finland 11.1 13.2 13.3 14.1
euro area 10.3 9.5 8.9 8.9
Denmark 14.4 15.5 13.6 12.4
Sweden 12.9 16.3 18.2 16.4
United Kingdom 9.8 13.4 15.2 13.6
United States 18.2 19.3 19.9 18.814
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some manufacturing industries ICT has largely
contributed to rationalising production
processes by raising productivity growth
through the use of less input, in particular
unskilled labour. By contrast, in some service
sectors increased use of ICT may result in
increasing both labour productivity growth and
employment, in particular employment of
unskilled workers. Finally, information on
sectoral developments makes the links between
labour productivity changes and product
market competition more straightforward.
This section focuses mainly on the distinction
between the ICT-producing and ICT-using
sectors. In particular, the ICT-producing
manufacturing sectors and the ICT-using
service sectors (see the Appendix for an
overview of the sectors) seem to be the key
sectors in explaining diverging labour
productivity growth developments between the
Nordic EU countries and the larger euro area
countries. In addition, within a neoclassical
framework it is critical to distinguish the use of
ICT and the production of ICT. ICT is both an
output from ICT-producing industries and an
input to ICT-using industries, so there are two
effects. The massive quality improvements in
ICT contribute to faster growth in the ICT-
producing industries and faster input
accumulation in the ICT-using industries.
Thus, the neoclassical model predicts rapid
capital deepening and higher average labour
productivity growth in ICT-using industries. In
the ICT-producing industries, it predicts higher
technical progress and TFP growth (Stiroh,
2000).
4.2 SECTORAL DEVELOPMENTS IN 1996-2002
As shown in Figure 3, the contribution of the
ICT-producing manufacturing sectors over the
period 1996-2002 in Finland was significantly
higher than in the larger euro area economies
(and higher also than in Denmark, Sweden, the
United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, the
United States). The contribution of the ICT-
producing manufacturing sectors to aggregate
labour productivity growth was four times
higher than in the euro area as a whole and three
times higher than in Germany, which had the
highest contribution of ICT-producing
manufacturing sectors among the larger euro
area economies. Looking at changes in labour
productivity and the weight of the sectors, it
can be seen that the higher contribution in
Finland is explained by both stronger labour
productivity growth and a higher GDP share
(see Table 4), which reflects a stronger
efficiency and specialisation in Finland
compared with the larger euro area countries.
Although the ICT-producing manufacturing
sectors are small (4% of total GDP), they
contributed almost one-third of the aggregate
labour productivity growth.
Figure 3 Sectoral contribution to aggregate
hourly labour productivity growth: 1996-
2002
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In addition, the contribution of the ICT-using
service sectors to aggregate labour productivity
growth in Finland was stronger than in the larger
euro area countries, mainly thanks to higher
labour productivity growth. Together these two
sectors accounted for around 50% of aggregate
labour productivity growth, while they only
accounted for 20% of GDP.
In Sweden the contribution of the ICT-using
service sectors was significantly higher than in
the larger euro area economies. The
contribution of the ICT-using service sectors to
aggregate labour productivity growth was
twice as high as in the euro area as a whole and
50% higher than in Germany, which again
achieved the highest contribution of the ICT-
using service sectors among the larger euro
area economies. Only the United Kingdom and
the United States had higher contributions of
the ICT-using service sectors. The strong
contribution of the ICT-using service sectors to
aggregate labour productivity growth in
Sweden was only driven by higher labour
productivity growth (see Table 4). As was also
the case for Finland, the GDP share was
significantly below the ratio observed in the
larger euro area countries, reflecting higher
efficiency but not higher specialisation in this
sector compared with the larger euro area
countries. This sector has contributed almost
one-third to aggregate labour productivity
growth in Sweden, while it has represented
only 18% of total GDP.
In addition, the contribution of the ICT-
producing manufacturing sector to aggregate
labour productivity growth in Sweden was
stronger than in the larger euro area countries,
with the exception of Germany, mainly thanks




Labour productivity growth (%) GDP share (%)
Manufacturing Services Total Manufacturing Services Total
Germany 20.3 11.9 14.1 1.4 4.0 5.4
Spain 0.6 3.1 2.7 0.7 3.4 4.1
France 12.6 5.0 6.9 1.4 4.0 5.3
Italy 1.0 4.9 4.1 1.0 3.7 4.6
Finland 20.9 7.1 13.7 4.0 4.4 8.3
Euro area 13.9 7.4 9.1 1.3 3.9 5.1
Denmark 4.4 3.0 3.3 1.1 3.5 4.6
Sweden 13.8 2.7 6.1 2.0 4.6 6.5
United Kingdom 8.0 6.6 7.0 1.7 5.1 6.8
United States 29.6 2.8 10.9 2.1 4.9 7.0
ICT-using
Labour productivity growth (%) GDP share (%)
Manufacturing Services Total Manufacturing Services Total
Germany 2.9 1.8 2.1 7.4 20.7 28.1
Spain 1.7 0.6 0.8 4.4 17.8 22.1
France 3.1 0.9 1.3 4.8 20.4 25.2
Italy 1.7 0.7 0.9 6.7 22.9 29.6
Finland 1.8 2.8 2.5 6.9 15.7 22.6
Euro area 2.1 1.1 1.4 6.1 20.9 27.0
Denmark 1.0 2.4 2.1 5.9 19.9 25.9
Sweden 2.7 3.1 3.0 5.9 18.0 23.9
United Kingdom 2.1 3.6 3.3 6.0 21.2 27.2
United States 2.6 5.5 5.0 4.7 24.6 29.3
Source: GGDC database.16
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to a higher GDP share (see Table 4). Together
these two sectors accounted for almost 50% of
aggregate labour productivity growth, while
they only represented 20% of total GDP.
However, even if these ratios are similar to the
ratios observed in Finland, when looking at
these sectors in Sweden it seems that a larger
number of sub-sectors contributed to this
performance than was the case in Finland. In
Germany the ratios represented one-third and
22% respectively, compared with two-thirds
and 27% in the United States.
Finally, Denmark also tended to exceed the
largest euro area countries in the ICT-using
service sectors, but lagged significantly behind
Germany and France with regard to the ICT-
producing manufacturing sectors. Like in
Finland and Sweden, the stronger contribution
of the ICT-using service sectors to aggregate
labour productivity growth in Denmark was
driven by higher labour productivity growth.
The ICT-using service sectors contributed
almost one-third to aggregate labour
productivity growth, while they accounted for
only 20% of total GDP.
In sum, the sectoral analysis tends to confirm
the findings observed in section 3, that
technological changes and innovation have
played a major role in explaining diverging
labour productivity growth developments
between the Nordic EU countries (mainly
Finland and Sweden) and the larger euro area
countries.
5 SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
5.1 IMPORTANCE OF ICT DIFFUSION IN
SERVICE SECTORS
As seen from the analysis above, ICT appears to
have been one of the main factors explaining the
underlying rise in labour productivity in the
Nordic EU countries since the middle of the
1990s. Various studies have shown that rapid
technological developments in the ICT-
producing industries play a major role in the
revival of TFP growth (see Oliner and Sichel
(2002) and Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2002)),
while the increased use of ICT is the main factor
driving the acceleration in labour productivity
growth in the service sectors. Given the large
economies of scale and high costs of research
and development involved with new ICT
products, only a few countries will have the
necessary comparative advantages to succeed in
producing them. Moreover, the ICT-producing
sectors are characterised by very rapid
technological progress, strong competition,
price declines and high labour productivity
growth. This is not necessarily a problem for
other countries as a substantial part of the
benefits of ICT production accrues to importing
countries and to users who can benefit from
rapid declines in the price of investment and
consumer goods (Bayoumi and Haacker, 2002).
Much of the current interest in ICT’s potential
impact on growth is, therefore, not linked to the
ICT-producing sectors, but to the potential
benefits arising from its use in the production
process elsewhere in the economy (see Pilat, Lee
and van Ark, 2002).12 Therefore, and in light of
the results above, the main issue for the larger
euro area countries is their lower capacity to
diffuse ICT products, in particular in the service
sectors. By contrast, the Nordic EU countries
have performed particularly well in terms of
labour productivity in the ICT-using services
sectors, despite the somewhat smaller size of
these sectors (in relation to GDP) compared with
the larger euro area countries.
Figure 4 would seem to confirm the great
importance of ICT diffusion for labour
productivity growth by showing a positive
correlation between ICT investment, as
reflected by the share of ICT capital relative to
total capital services, and hourly labour
12 For instance, the use of ICT may help firms expand their
product range, customise the services offered, or respond
better to client demand – in short, to innovate. Moreover, ICT
may help reduce inefficiency in the use of capital and labour,
e.g. by reducing inventories. All these effects might lead to
higher productivity growth.17
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productivity growth in the ICT-using service
sectors.
Looking at labour productivity growth in
selected ICT-using service sectors in the period
1996-2002 (see Table 5), it appears that,
similar to the United States, the Nordic EU
countries have outperformed the larger euro
area countries in wholesale and retail trade13, as
well as in the different sectors of financial
intermediation.
5.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT
On the basis of the sectoral analysis, one
important question arises relating to the
implications for employment growth of the
developments in sectoral labour productivity
growth. While the complexity and diversity of
factors affecting employment growth extends
beyond the scope of this paper, the
development of employment in various sectors
can provide a first insight. The data presented
in Figure 5 seem to suggest different patterns
between the manufacturing and service sectors.
The labour input (total hours worked)
increased more in the service sectors than in the
manufacturing sectors in all countries over the
period 1996-2002. This is in line with the long-
term trend of the manufacturing sector
declining in importance in the higher income
countries. In the manufacturing sectors the
countries with relatively stronger hourly labour
productivity growth have, generally, also had
negative labour input growth, with the
exception of Finland and the United States in
the ICT-producing sectors and Spain in the
ICT-producing and using manufacturing
13 For an analysis of the reasons behind the high productivity
growth in the United States in retail and wholesale trade, see
van Ark, McGuckin and Spiegelman (2005).
Figure 4 ICT-capital share and hourly labour
productivity growth in ICT-using service
sectors: 1996-2002
(annual average; in percent)
Source: GGDC database.
Table 5 Hourly labour productivity growth in ICT-using service sectors: 1996-2002
(in %)
DE ES FR IT FI EA DK SE UK US
Wholesale trade and commission trade.
except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 1.6 0.2 1.1 0.2 2.3 1.1 4.6 2.8 3.0 8.5
Retail trade. except of motor vehicles and
motorcycles; repair of personal and
household goods 1.3 0.5 1.4 0.3 2.5 0.9 -0.7 4.1 3.2 7.4
Financial intermediation. except insurance
and pension funding 6.5 2.2 0.5 2.3 7.2 3.4 5.1 -0.1 4.5 3.9
Insurance and pension funding. except
compulsory social security -4.5 -2.1 2.3 2.4 6.5 -1.1 5.9 7.0 0.4 1.3
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 1.3 5.1 3.0 -2.5 2.8 1.4 1.1 7.8 2.1 10.6
Renting of machinery and equipment 0.7 -0.3 1.0 -5.0 2.0 0.5 -2.3 7.2 -0.1 5.6
Research and development 2.6 -3.0 0.3 1.6 -0.5 0.6 0.3 -0.7 -3.0 2.4
Legal. technical and advertising -1.3 0.1 0.3 -0.5 2.4 -0.8 -0.1 1.9 6.8 -0.2
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Figure 5 Sectoral hourly labour productivity and labour input growth rates: 1996-2002
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sectors. By contrast, in the service sectors clear
positive developments in both labour input and
hourly labour productivity growth can be
observed, with the exception of Germany in the
ICT-producing sectors, where the relatively
strong hourly labour productivity growth was
accompanied by relatively weak labour input
growth. Finally, in the ICT-using service
sectors, the Nordic EU countries, the United
Kingdom and the United States have generally
managed to combine both high labour
productivity growth and high labour input
growth, in contrast to the larger euro area
countries.14 At the same time, those countries
have also reached a higher ICT capital
deepening and/or a higher ICT capital share as
percent of total capital.
In sum, given the higher potential for creating
employment in the service sectors combined
with the fact that there is no apparent trade-off
between labour productivity and employment
growth thanks to increased ICT use in the
service sectors, ICT diffusion appears to be
particularly relevant in the service sector from
a policy point of view.
14 A report by Cahuc and Debonneuil (2004) highlights the fact
that it was possible for France to increase employment, in
particular unskilled employment, and labour productivity
growth in some service sectors such as hotels and restaurants
and wholesale and retail trade thanks to increasing use of ICT.
ICT-producing service sectors
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5 SOME POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS 5.3 FACTORS EXPLAINING HIGH
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN THE NORDIC
EU COUNTRIES
The ability to take advantage of the possibilities
offered by new technology depends on a mix of
interdependent factors, such as the conditions
for innovation, the possibilities for developing
new goods and services commercially, and the
available financing and human capital. Policies
targeted at increasing innovation and
technological diffusion can be grouped into
three broad categories. First, there are policies
aimed at easing regulations. Indeed, regulations
limiting competition in goods, services, labour
and capital markets, for instance by limiting
entrepreneurial activities, imposing entry
restrictions or affecting labour market
adaptability such as hiring and firing rules, have
negative repercussions on innovation and
technological advancements (see Scarpetta
et al, 2002). Second, policies aimed at
improving human capital are usually considered
to be of utmost importance. Technological
advancements imply that jobs shift from low to
high-skilled workers through a process of
“creative destruction”. Therefore, measures
favouring improvements in skills and lifelong
learning contribute to further innovation,
facilitate the use of advanced technologies and
allow technological change to translate into
more jobs. Griliches (1969) was the first to put
forward the idea of the capital-skill
complementarity hypothesis. Since then, the
connection between ICT and human capital has
mostly been disregarded in assessments of the
productivity effects of ICT. However, Kaiser
(2003) finds strong evidence for
complementarity between expenditure on ICT
and outlays for ICT personnel. One possible
explanation, commonly mentioned in the
literature, is that the diffusion of ICT is
associated with learning costs that decrease over
time, as a function of the increasing number of
users. More widespread knowledge about how
to exploit ICT seems to speed up the rate of
diffusion. Finally, policies aimed at promoting
venture capital and investment in R&D are
also important drivers of innovation and
technological change.15 While private venture
capital markets can allow for a greater role of the
market mechanism in financing innovation as an
alternative or complement to traditional
financial R&D support, thereby providing
greater efficiency in the allocation of finance,
higher outlays on R&D should, ceteris paribus,
yield higher results in terms of innovation.
In all these categories, the Nordic EU countries
are particularly well positioned in international
comparisons. By contrast, some of the larger
euro area countries which have performed
relatively poorly in terms of labour
productivity are also less well positioned in
terms of regulations, human and venture
capital, and R&D. Denmark, Finland and
Sweden are small, open and well integrated
economies, with low transposition deficits
with regard to EU Directives and relatively low
barriers in the form of product market
regulation (see Table 6). This partly reflects a
process of early liberalisation of several
network industries, such as rail and air
transport, the postal, telecommunications16 and
15 See A. Bassanini, S. Scarpetta and P. Hemmings (2001).
16 The emergence of two world-leading telecommunications
companies in Finland and Sweden is significant in explaining
labour productivity developments in these two countries.
Table 6 OECD Structural indicators: Product
Market Regulation (PMR) and Employment
Protection Legislation (EPL) indicators: 2003
Source: OECD.
Note: A higher number reflects stronger regulation.
EPL on EPL on
regular temporary
PMR contracts contracts
Germany 1.3 2.7 2.0
France 1.6 2.5 3.6
Spain 1.5 2.9 1.8
Italy 1.8 1.8 2.1
Finland 1.3 2.2 1.9
Euro area 1.4 2.5 2.1
Denmark 1.1 1.5 1.4
Sweden 1.1 2.9 1.6
United Kingdom 0.9 1.1 0.4
United States 1.0 0.3 0.220
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electricity markets, and the financial markets,
which mostly took place in the 1980s and early
1990s. In terms of labour market regulations,
the Nordic countries are more similar to the
larger euro area countries, although there exist
significant differences among them (see Table
6). While Denmark is considered to have a
relatively flexible labour market combined
with a high degree of income protection,
Sweden and Finland have made relatively less
progress on reforming incentive structures in
favour of work (OECD, 2004a and 2004c).
Nevertheless, the use of temporary contracts
increased significantly in both Finland and
Sweden in the aftermath of the severe recession
in the early 1990s. As can be seen in Table 6,
employment protection has tended to be lower
for this type of contract. As product and labour
market features can have important
complementary effects, remaining labour
market rigidities may inhibit the full
realisation of employment gains from greater
competition and innovation. In particular, there
seems to be an inverse relationship across
OECD countries between tight product market
regulation and high employment protection
legislation on the one hand and the share of ICT
investment in total fixed investment on the
other hand (see Pilat and Devlin, 2004). This
could potentially explain the relatively weaker
capital deepening, both for ICT and non-ICT,
in Finland in the late 1990s compared with
Denmark and Sweden (as seen in Figure 2
above).
In terms of educational attainment, the Nordic
EU countries traditionally rank high in
international comparisons. Schools and
universities in the Nordic EU countries are
mostly free and governments provide generous
student grant and loan systems at university
level. Interestingly, the highest levels of
education may not yield the greatest effects on
productivity. In a study by Gunnarsson et al.
(2004), the largest indirect effects of ICT on
productivity are associated with workers
having upper secondary education relative to
workers with only nine years of education.
While Denmark and Sweden have a relatively
large share of persons with upper secondary
education, as also do Germany and the United
States, all three Nordic EU countries have a
relatively high share of persons with tertiary
education, although they still lag behind the
United States in this regard (see Table 7).
Finally, in terms of venture capital and
innovation, as measured by R&D, the Nordic
EU countries are again positioned among the
best performers. As can be seen in Figure 6,
Sweden and Finland, together with the United
States, have recorded much higher volumes of
venture capital investment on average in the
period 1995-2003 in the early stages for start-
up companies, while Sweden also had higher
volumes of venture capital for expansion and
replacement, outperformed only by the United
Kingdom and the United States.
Similarly, R&D expenses between 1995 and
2003 were clearly the highest in Sweden and
Finland, followed by the United States and
Germany, with private sector R&D dominating
(see Figure 7).
These underlying factors also figure in various
rankings of countries in terms of
competitiveness, where Denmark, Finland and
Table 7 Educational attainment of the





Germany 17.4 59.4 23.2
Spain 59.7 16.2 23.6
France 36.1 40.6 23.0
Italy 56.7 33.2 10.0
Finland 26.2 41.5 32.3
Euro area 39.7 39.8 20.4
Denmark 19.8 53.7 26.5
Sweden 19.4 49.0 31.6
United Kingdom 37.1 36.9 26.1
United States 12.3 50.3 37.3
Source: OECD.21
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Sweden are often listed among the best
performers. In a recent study by the World
Economic Forum and Insead (2005), the three
Nordic EU countries all came within the
highest six places in an index evaluating the
relative level of ICT development among 104
nations (the Networked Readiness Index).17
This index, compiled by measuring the relative
strength of factors such as the environment for
ICT development, readiness and usage by
individuals, businesses and government,
measures the propensity for countries to
exploit the opportunities offered by ICT.
While the above-mentioned factors offer some
insights into why the Nordic EU countries have
been successful in diffusing ICT at an early
stage, they do not provide a complete account
of the underlying reasons for the success of
these countries in implementing measures
favouring competitive product markets, human
and venture capital, and R&D. It is noteworthy
that other factors, relating to labour market
rigidities, high tax levels and generous welfare
benefits, are often put forward in the context of
the Nordic EU countries as factors that hamper
the efficiency of their economies and the
development of new businesses and
innovation. Moreover, a complete account also
needs to include the declining trend in ICT
prices, which for Sweden and Finland, as
important ICT exporters, results in a much less
favourable development of per capita GDP due
to declining terms of trade (OECD, 2004c).
In terms of structural changes in the economy,
one specific feature relates to Finland and
Sweden. The severe recession in the early
1990s was indeed large by historical standards
in those countries,18 leading to sizeable
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17 Singapore, Iceland and the United States were also among
the six highest, with the United Kingdom in 12th position,
Germany 14th , France 20th, Spain 29th and Italy 45th.
18 In Finland GDP fell by more than 10% in volume between
1990 and 1993, while it fell by around 4% in Sweden.
Figure 6 Venture capital investment
(average 1995-2003, as % of GDP)
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Source: Eurostat.
Note: Venture capital investment is defined as private equity
raised for investment in companies; management buyouts,
management buyins and venture purchase of quoted shares
are excluded. Data are broken down into two investment
stages: the early stage (seed and start-up), and expansion and
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depreciation of their currencies and the
emergence of structural unemployment
comparable to other European countries for the
first time. The recession included asymmetric
elements, such as sizeable banking crises and,
in Finland, the disruption of trade relations
with the Soviet Union. Cost-cutting measures
implemented in production and the rapid
decline in labour input can explain most of the
rapid improvement in productivity growth in
the years following the recession, although
there was also considerable scrapping of the
capital stock. Many low-skilled workers left
the labour market and have not been fully
reintegrated, as reflected by the lower
employment rates than had been the case prior
to the crisis and the higher number of inactive
people.19 In both Sweden and Finland the rise in
the number of people outside the labour force in
the 1990s coincided with a rise in the number of
people in early retirement and disability
benefit schemes as well as in education.
In response to the crisis, a number of structural
changes, initiated by both the government and
social partners, were implemented in Finland
and Sweden and they could explain the
improvement in long-term productivity
growth. In both countries a rapid redistribution
of the labour force took place, from low to high-
productivity sectors as labour-intense
production was moved to emerging markets,
and from the public to the private sector. The
fact that the size of the public sector in the
economy stopped increasing in the early 1990s
is also likely to explain higher productivity
growth, as productivity in the public sector is
normally lower than in the business sector.
Moreover, as in the euro area, increased
macroeconomic stability was achieved in both
Finland and Sweden by focusing more strongly
on an institutional framework favouring price
stability and fiscal prudence.20 Although
already very open economies, competition was
increased further by accession to the EU. In
Sweden other measures, such as a liberalisation
of opening hours, increased use of temporary
employment contracts and, toward the latter
part of the 1990s, an increase in the number of
university places and tax deductibility for
purchases of home computers, may also have
played an important role. In recent years
increased openness and integration with the
global economy, which has allowed for
streamlining and outsourcing of labour-
intensive stages of the production of goods and
services to some of the new EU Member States,
in particular the Baltic States, and Asia,
appears to have had a renewed effect on
productivity growth in both Sweden and
Finland (see, for example, Sveriges Riksbank,
2004).
In Denmark, labour productivity did not
accelerate in the same way as in Sweden and
Finland in the late 1990s and the early part of
this decade, reflecting a much less dynamic
transition to high-tech sectors than in Sweden
and Finland. Instead, non-ICT capital
deepening explains most of the labour
productivity growth, although ICT capital
deepening was also higher than in the larger
euro area countries in the late 1990s (see Figure
2). Compared with other countries, Denmark
was unusually capital-intensive in the late
1990s, which could be linked to relatively
generous wage levels for low-skilled workers
leading firms to substitute capital for labour
(OECD, 2004b). Another explanation could be
the relatively tight labour market and the
insufficient labour supply, causing substitution
towards capital investment.
In sum, the relatively higher labour
productivity growth in the Nordic EU countries
appears to confirm the beneficial effects on
productivity of a high degree of product and
financial market competition, combined with a
high level of R&D and highly skilled human
capital. While many of these features have
traditionally been present in the Nordic EU
countries, the crises in Finland and Sweden
certainly accelerated the modernisation of the
economies and led to significant structural
19 The employment rate in Sweden in 2004 was more than
9 percentage points lower than in 1990, while it fell by
6.6 percentage points in Finland over the same period.
20 Finland has been a member of the euro area since 1999.23
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6 CONCLUSION
changes. Combined with stability-oriented
economic policies, with a strong focus on price
stability and sound public finances, a
favourable climate for ICT investments and
innovation appears to have been created. These
“comparative advantages” probably facilitated
the expansion of ICT production and diffusion
and may explain why the structural
characteristics of these economies were more
conducive to exploiting the opportunities
provided by new technologies than was the
case in the larger euro area economies. At the
same time, remaining labour market rigidities
may inhibit the full realisation of employment
gains from greater competition and innovation,
given that product and labour market features
can have important complementary effects.
6 CONCLUSION
Since the second half of the 1990s, the Nordic
EU countries, particularly Sweden and
Finland, have experienced stronger hourly
labour productivity growth than the larger euro
area countries. Combined with a high level of
labour utilisation, this has resulted in a
“structural” labour productivity level that is
relatively high compared with some of the
larger euro area countries. Like in the United
States, innovation and technological changes
have played a major role in explaining the
higher labour productivity growth in the
Nordic EU countries compared with the larger
euro area economies since the mid-1990s.
The results of the decomposition of labour
productivity growth show that both ICT and
non-ICT capital deepening have been the main
contributors to hourly labour productivity
growth in Denmark. These two components
have also been much higher than in the larger
euro area countries. In terms of the sectoral
composition, Denmark has tended to outperform
the largest euro area countries in the ICT-using
service sectors, but it lags significantly behind
Germany and France with regard to the ICT-
producing manufacturing sectors.
In contrast, TFP growth has played a greater role
in Sweden and Finland. In Sweden the stronger
hourly labour productivity growth compared
with the larger euro area countries was mainly
driven by the contribution of TFP and, to a lesser
extent, of ICT-capital deepening. At the sectoral
level, there was a high contribution of the ICT-
using service sectors, while the ICT-producing
manufacturing sector also contributed to
widening the labour productivity gap with the
larger euro area countries. In Finland the high
hourly labour productivity growth is mainly
explained by a high contribution of TFP growth.
At the sectoral level, the high contribution of the
ICT-producing manufacturing sectors was the
main reason for increased labour productivity
growth relative to the larger euro area countries,
although the contribution of the ICT-using
service sectors has also been greater than in the
larger euro area countries. In both Sweden and
Finland these two sectors accounted for around
50% of aggregate labour productivity growth
while they only account for 20% of total GDP.
However, while the ratios are similar, when
looking within these sectors it seems that a larger
number of sub-sectors have contributed to this
performance in Sweden than in Finland.
Given that only a few countries may have the
necessary comparative advantages to succeed
in the ICT-producing sectors that are
characterised by very rapid technological
progress, strong competition, price declines
and high labour productivity growth, much of
the interest in the potential impact of ICT on
growth is linked to the potential benefits
arising from its use in the production process
elsewhere in the economy. From a policy point
of view, given the higher potential for
employment creation in the services sectors
combined with the evidence that there is no
apparent trade-off in the medium term between
labour productivity and employment growth
thanks to increased ICT use, ICT diffusion
appears to be particularly relevant in the
services sectors. As a result, the key issue for
other countries is how to increase their future
capacity to promote the diffusion of
innovation. This relates in particular to24
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technological changes in the service sectors,
such as wholesale and retail trade as well as
different sectors of financial intermediation, in
which the Nordic EU countries have performed
particularly well.
In the Nordic EU countries, the high degree of
product and financial market competition,
resulting from early liberalisation of key
markets and relatively low barriers in the form
of product market regulation, a highly skilled
workforce, high investments in R&D and the
availability of venture capital, all areas in
which the Nordic countries are among the best
performers, seem to be the main explanatory
factors behind the rise in productivity growth.
By contrast, some of the larger euro area
countries which have performed relatively
poorly in terms of labour productivity are also
lagging behind in terms of these factors. These
“comparative advantages” probably facilitated
the expansion of ICT production and diffusion
and may explain why the structural
characteristics of these economies were more
conducive to exploiting the opportunities
provided by new technologies than the larger
euro area countries. In Sweden and Finland
structural changes leading to these favourable
conditions were partly triggered as a response
to the severe recession in the early 1990s, while
in Denmark structural change appears to have
been more gradual. Importantly, remaining
labour market rigidities in the Nordic EU
countries may inhibit the full realisation of
employment gains from greater competition
and innovation, given that product and labour
market features can have important
complementary effects.
Looking ahead, and given the need to further
increase the level of labour resource utilisation
in the larger euro area countries, the gap in
labour productivity growth between the larger
euro area countries and the Nordic EU
countries may widen further, unless
appropriate structural reforms occur in the euro
area. In this respect, the experience of the
Nordic EU countries provides some useful
insights and lessons.25
ECB




ICT-producing Office machinery Communications
Insulated wire Computer and related activities
Electronic valves and tubes
Telecommunication equipment
Radio and television receivers
Scientific instruments
ICT-using Clothing Wholesale trade and commission
trade, except of motor vehicles
and motorcycles
Printing & publishing Retail trade, except of motor
vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal
and household goods
Mechanical engineering Financial intermediation, except insurance
and pension funding
Other electrical machinery and Insurance and pension
apparatus nec funding, except compulsory
social security
Other instruments Activities auxiliary to financial
intermediation
Building and repairing of ships and boats Renting of machinery and equipment
Aircraft and spacecraft Research and development




ICT-producing and using sectors
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